Harming the Poor
Thomas Pogge's 2002 book World Poverty and Human Rights is an interesting book. However, I do think that there is a mistake in the central claim of the book. I intend to investigate this in more detail and put it in an article. The basic thought is simple...
According to Thomas Pogge in his 2002 book and lots of publications before and after then, we, rich inhabitants of the developed nations are harming the poor by our acquiescence and (indirect) support of national and international institutions. Those institutions rig the terms under which the poor participate in national and international (market-)interactions. From export subsidies to trade tariffs and several aspects of international law: we are harming the poor. Since even the most right-wing conservative libertarians (an oxymoron, I admit, but you know who I mean) believe in the harm principle, it seems that we all are under a strict duty to stop harming the poor and compensate them. This means that we should radically reform international institutions and increase the level of development aid (as well as the terms under which aid is given).
While I agree with Pogge's conclusion (I believe that the US and the the EU are screwing the poor nations in Africa and elsewhere) I doubt that a well-thinking libertarian would be convinced by Pogge's argument. Consider why: in order for there to be harm, as Pogge claims, you need to prove a couple of things. First, you have to demonstrate that there is a relevant and robust causal chain between your actions and the effects on your victim. For example, it could be that by clapping my hands now, I set up a pattern in the weather over sub-saharan Africa causing all kinds of natural disasters over there. That could not count as harm. However, actively burning crops in those countries clearly is. Secondly, you need to show that the alledged victims are worse off than they would have been. This is really tricky in the cases that Pogge describes, for it is unclear what the relevant basis of comparison should be. I will discuss only two suggestions (there are lots more).
It could be the case that you should compare the actual situation with the case where the West never colonized Africa and never would have had any interactions? However, then it is unclear whether the Africans are really worse off. Suppose you opt for the following alternative: compare the actual situation to the situation where the West interacted with Africa under decent terms and with open markets. Then it is clear the the Africans are worse off, except you now beg the question as to whether the developed nations are violating the rights of the African poor. How this is the case will become clear if we look at the third condition.
Third, you need to show that the causal effect that had a worsening influence involved a rights violation of sorts. Compare the following case: suppose I open a restaurant in the same street as you. As a result, you no longer attract the same number of customer's that you had before. It is clear that you are worse off as a (reliable and robust causal) result of my actions. You are worse of than you would have been in my absence. However, I doubt anybody will claim that I am harming you. Why? Because I am not violating any rights on your part.
This latter condition is important. One of its implications is that it blocks any argument of the following sort:
The conclusion does not follow: you cannot conclude from a worsening effect that your rights have been violated.
A similar mistake seems to be going on when Pogge claims we are harming the poor. From the fact that were the international institutions different, the poor would be better off, one cannot conclude that these institutions are violating a rights of the poor. Only if you have accepted a background of certain rights, can you determine whether or not a specific causal worsening effect is harmful and therefore forbidden. I suspect that those pre-accepted background rights will be so strong that not many libertarians are eager to accept them. For example, such a right as the right to sufficient food, shelter, etc., is not a right that a libertarian will endorse. As a result, I do not think that Pogge's argument shows that we, in the rich countries, are harming the poor.
A better and much more honest way to criticise the West is to argue that we have a positive imperfect obligation to alleviate the suffering in the world. And since it is so damn cheap to do so (as Pogge and others show us), we have to satisfy this obligation at much, much higher levels than we are doing now.
According to Thomas Pogge in his 2002 book and lots of publications before and after then, we, rich inhabitants of the developed nations are harming the poor by our acquiescence and (indirect) support of national and international institutions. Those institutions rig the terms under which the poor participate in national and international (market-)interactions. From export subsidies to trade tariffs and several aspects of international law: we are harming the poor. Since even the most right-wing conservative libertarians (an oxymoron, I admit, but you know who I mean) believe in the harm principle, it seems that we all are under a strict duty to stop harming the poor and compensate them. This means that we should radically reform international institutions and increase the level of development aid (as well as the terms under which aid is given).
While I agree with Pogge's conclusion (I believe that the US and the the EU are screwing the poor nations in Africa and elsewhere) I doubt that a well-thinking libertarian would be convinced by Pogge's argument. Consider why: in order for there to be harm, as Pogge claims, you need to prove a couple of things. First, you have to demonstrate that there is a relevant and robust causal chain between your actions and the effects on your victim. For example, it could be that by clapping my hands now, I set up a pattern in the weather over sub-saharan Africa causing all kinds of natural disasters over there. That could not count as harm. However, actively burning crops in those countries clearly is. Secondly, you need to show that the alledged victims are worse off than they would have been. This is really tricky in the cases that Pogge describes, for it is unclear what the relevant basis of comparison should be. I will discuss only two suggestions (there are lots more).
It could be the case that you should compare the actual situation with the case where the West never colonized Africa and never would have had any interactions? However, then it is unclear whether the Africans are really worse off. Suppose you opt for the following alternative: compare the actual situation to the situation where the West interacted with Africa under decent terms and with open markets. Then it is clear the the Africans are worse off, except you now beg the question as to whether the developed nations are violating the rights of the African poor. How this is the case will become clear if we look at the third condition.
Third, you need to show that the causal effect that had a worsening influence involved a rights violation of sorts. Compare the following case: suppose I open a restaurant in the same street as you. As a result, you no longer attract the same number of customer's that you had before. It is clear that you are worse off as a (reliable and robust causal) result of my actions. You are worse of than you would have been in my absence. However, I doubt anybody will claim that I am harming you. Why? Because I am not violating any rights on your part.
This latter condition is important. One of its implications is that it blocks any argument of the following sort:
- Since my action of opening the restaurant result in a worse situation for me, I have harmed you.
- Therefore, I have violated your rights and I owe you compensation and I ought to make sure that it will never happen again.
The conclusion does not follow: you cannot conclude from a worsening effect that your rights have been violated.
A similar mistake seems to be going on when Pogge claims we are harming the poor. From the fact that were the international institutions different, the poor would be better off, one cannot conclude that these institutions are violating a rights of the poor. Only if you have accepted a background of certain rights, can you determine whether or not a specific causal worsening effect is harmful and therefore forbidden. I suspect that those pre-accepted background rights will be so strong that not many libertarians are eager to accept them. For example, such a right as the right to sufficient food, shelter, etc., is not a right that a libertarian will endorse. As a result, I do not think that Pogge's argument shows that we, in the rich countries, are harming the poor.
A better and much more honest way to criticise the West is to argue that we have a positive imperfect obligation to alleviate the suffering in the world. And since it is so damn cheap to do so (as Pogge and others show us), we have to satisfy this obligation at much, much higher levels than we are doing now.
posted by Bruno at Friday, October 21, 2005
2 Comments:
Your argument against Pogge seems right to me.
But what about the claim that people in Third World countries have a right to compensation from us, since a fair amount of our affluence is due to (neo-)colonial exploitation? Or, put rather differently: suppose it could be shown that there is a net flow of assets from Third to First World, in earlier times through more or less straightforward theft and these days through trade-barriers (etc). If moreover the right to property is accepted (surely well-thinking libertarians do accept this?), and the net flow of assets accepted to be involuntary (on the part of the Third World), then it should not be so difficult to show that harm is being done?
The difficulty lies possibly in the last point... but...
Hi There,
Interesting analysis. However, I do not agree with it. Libertarians do endorse certain minimal rights relative to which we could establish that there was a harm. Libertarians usually endorse the lockean theory of private proverty, according to which everybody is entitled to own resources as long as there is enough for everybody (Lockean proviso). This argument could be used to establish a more consistent normative baseline.
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