The Eutyphro Problem I
I was involved in a most interesting e-mail exchange for the better part of November and December of last year. It all started with a claim about the notorious Eutyphro problem for so-called 'divine command theory'. The claim, poffered by Chris Morris, was that the traditional Eutyphro dilemma is not a dilemma if one makes a distinction between what is 'right' and what is 'good'.
Let me explain. Divine command theory (aka 'theological voluntarism') is the view that one ought to do something if and only if God commands it. More precise, an action is right if and only if God commands it. There is an old dialogue written by Plato entitled Eutyphro in which that old scoundrel Socrates has a discussion with young Eutyphro on the street. Eutyphro is on his way to the courts to denounce his father. In the course of the 'discussion' (for it really is a monologue where Eutyphro's contributions are restricted to utterances such as "Indeed!", "Pray go on...", "I see....", etc.) Socrates asks Eutyphro "Are acts pious because the Gods command them, or do the Gods command these actions because they are pious?" The dialogue does not really give an answer, but later philosophers have taken this question to be the kiss of death for divine command theory (DCT).
The reason is that this question can be reformulated as an inescapable dilemma for DCT-ers: "Is an action right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is right". If it is the case that an action is right simply because God commands it, it seems that God could have commanded just about everything and it would be 'right'. Thus, if God had said 'go and kill all Canaans, rape their women and butcher their children' this would be right. But how could this be right? Murder, rape and infanticide are wrong and it seems, they are wrong necessarily. DCT cannot explain why these are wrong necessarily. Alternatively, if God commands us not to commit murder etc., because these actions are wrong it seems that God is irrelevant for the determination of what is wrong. Murder is wrong and God's commands do not add anything. In short, it seemed DCT is not a plausible theory of what is 'right'.
However, this is too fast. A DCT-er could argue that one ought to distinguish between the 'right' and the 'good', between 'duty' and 'value'. Then DCT can be salvaged from this dilemma. For God is such that he 'tracks' the good, what is valuable, and bases his commands on that. So God commands us not to commit murder and his command makes it our duty not to commit murder. However, the reason that God issues this command -- and issues it necessarily -- is that there is a connection between this command and what is good or valuable. (I am trying to avoid saying that the connection between the command and what is good is a consequentialist one. That is, it need not be the case that God commands us not to commit murder because such actions have the best feasible consequences. As long as there is some relation which makes it the case that God could not command us murder, rape, plunder and what have you...).
This seems correct -- at least to me, but I took a lot of flak trying to defend this view to others.
However, thus stated and defended, the Eutyphro problem (for it no longer is a dilemma) does point to a different problem for the DCT-er. A DCT-er has to have some story as to how God's commands can make and action right. What is it about God's commands (as opposed to mine for example) that make murder wrong? In other words, DCT can be defended against the Eutyphro problem, if it can be shown that God has moral authority. What could this authority be and how can you show that God (were he to exist) has it.
One final remark: this discussion is germane, not just for the assessment of a rather arcane view in moral philosophy that only a bunch of crazed, uncritical fundamentalist believers endorse. Similar problems arise for any alleged authority. For example, why ought one to do as the government commands? Why are the decisions of democratic bodies (e.g., a well-functioning parliament) legitimate? Why ought one to accept what experts (e.g., teachers) tell us to accept? Finally, note that there is a similar problem for you: why should you do what you decided to do?
I will come back to this later I hope...
In the mean time, check out the stuff here...
Let me explain. Divine command theory (aka 'theological voluntarism') is the view that one ought to do something if and only if God commands it. More precise, an action is right if and only if God commands it. There is an old dialogue written by Plato entitled Eutyphro in which that old scoundrel Socrates has a discussion with young Eutyphro on the street. Eutyphro is on his way to the courts to denounce his father. In the course of the 'discussion' (for it really is a monologue where Eutyphro's contributions are restricted to utterances such as "Indeed!", "Pray go on...", "I see....", etc.) Socrates asks Eutyphro "Are acts pious because the Gods command them, or do the Gods command these actions because they are pious?" The dialogue does not really give an answer, but later philosophers have taken this question to be the kiss of death for divine command theory (DCT).
The reason is that this question can be reformulated as an inescapable dilemma for DCT-ers: "Is an action right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is right". If it is the case that an action is right simply because God commands it, it seems that God could have commanded just about everything and it would be 'right'. Thus, if God had said 'go and kill all Canaans, rape their women and butcher their children' this would be right. But how could this be right? Murder, rape and infanticide are wrong and it seems, they are wrong necessarily. DCT cannot explain why these are wrong necessarily. Alternatively, if God commands us not to commit murder etc., because these actions are wrong it seems that God is irrelevant for the determination of what is wrong. Murder is wrong and God's commands do not add anything. In short, it seemed DCT is not a plausible theory of what is 'right'.
However, this is too fast. A DCT-er could argue that one ought to distinguish between the 'right' and the 'good', between 'duty' and 'value'. Then DCT can be salvaged from this dilemma. For God is such that he 'tracks' the good, what is valuable, and bases his commands on that. So God commands us not to commit murder and his command makes it our duty not to commit murder. However, the reason that God issues this command -- and issues it necessarily -- is that there is a connection between this command and what is good or valuable. (I am trying to avoid saying that the connection between the command and what is good is a consequentialist one. That is, it need not be the case that God commands us not to commit murder because such actions have the best feasible consequences. As long as there is some relation which makes it the case that God could not command us murder, rape, plunder and what have you...).
This seems correct -- at least to me, but I took a lot of flak trying to defend this view to others.
However, thus stated and defended, the Eutyphro problem (for it no longer is a dilemma) does point to a different problem for the DCT-er. A DCT-er has to have some story as to how God's commands can make and action right. What is it about God's commands (as opposed to mine for example) that make murder wrong? In other words, DCT can be defended against the Eutyphro problem, if it can be shown that God has moral authority. What could this authority be and how can you show that God (were he to exist) has it.
One final remark: this discussion is germane, not just for the assessment of a rather arcane view in moral philosophy that only a bunch of crazed, uncritical fundamentalist believers endorse. Similar problems arise for any alleged authority. For example, why ought one to do as the government commands? Why are the decisions of democratic bodies (e.g., a well-functioning parliament) legitimate? Why ought one to accept what experts (e.g., teachers) tell us to accept? Finally, note that there is a similar problem for you: why should you do what you decided to do?
I will come back to this later I hope...
In the mean time, check out the stuff here...
Labels: Philosophy
posted by Bruno at Friday, January 12, 2007
1 Comments:
I don't see how this distinction solves the dilemma. You still have the problem whether the gods (or God) commands something because it is good in itself or if it is good because the gods command it.
For I assume that the gods, according to DCT, could not command us to do something evil.
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